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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of increased trade on wage inequality in 
developing countries, and whether a higher human capital stock moderates this effect. We 
look at the skilled-unskilled wage differential. When better educated societies open up their 
economies, increased trade is likely to induce less inequality on impact because the supply of 
skills better matches demand. But greater international exposure also brings about 
technological diffusion, further raising skilled labour demand. This may raise wage 
inequality, in contrast to the initial egalitarian level effect of human capital.  We attempt to 
measure these two opposing forces. We also employ a broad set of indicators to measure 
trade liberalization policies as well as general openness, which is an outcome, and not a 
policy variable. We further examine what type of education most reduces inequality. Our 
findings suggest that countries with a higher level of initial human capital do well on the 
inequality front, but human capital which accrues through the trade liberalization channel has 
inegalitarian effects. Our results also have implications for the speed at which trade policies 
are liberalized, the implication being that better educated nations should liberalize faster. 
 
Keywords: Integration, Trade Liberalization, Wage Inequality. 
JEL Classifications: F-15, I-3 
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1 Introduction 
Increased trade, particularly of the inter-industry variety, alters the composition of 
output in the economy away from non-traded goods towards traded products. This 
will affect the functional distribution of income, usually raising the demand for the 
factor of production employed intensively in the traded sector. In the developed 
world, it is skilled labour and we have witnessed an increase in the skilled-unskilled 
labor relative wage premium. In many OECD countries, this has meant a more 
unequal personal distribution of income. As far as developing countries are 
concerned, especially in those that export unskilled labour intensive manufactured 
goods, we would expect a fall in the skilled-unskilled labour relative wage premium 
leading to reduced inequality, since the unskilled are more numerous within the 
population. Yet this is generally not true, and inequality in the developing world has 
risen, mirroring events in the OECD. What accounts for this paradox? Perhaps 
developing countries have such quantities of unskilled labour that unskilled wages 
will not respond to increased demand. This certainly appears likely in cross-country 
studies where China and India are included. Alternatively, other less populous 
developing countries may be exporting relatively more skilled labour intensive 
products such as semi-conductors or capital-intensive commodities as is the case with 
fuels and minerals. Finally, an expansion in international trade may raise the demand 
for, and reward of, skilled labour even when the country in question is exporting 
unskilled labour intensive products due to skill shortages and other factor 
complementarities. 
 
Many studies have tried to capture the relationship between trade liberalization and 
income inequality. A paper by Dollar and Kraay (2004) concludes that liberalization 
does not significantly affect the distribution of income, and at most, the relationship is 
of neutral nature. However, their results have been widely challenged because of their 
methodology and variable choice. (Ravallion 2003; Amann et al. 2002) Ravallion 
(2003) points out that increased openness can lead to a rise in the demand for 
relatively skilled labour, which tends towards less equal distribution in poor relative 
to rich countries. Arbache, Dickerson and Green (2004) find that imported technology 
raised the relative demand for highly skilled labour in Brazil and thus lowered the 
relative wages of less educated groups. Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2001) 
observe that inequality has increased in seven out of 18 Latin American countries that 
initiated market reforms in the mid-1980s. Jayasuriya (2002) accepts that trade 
liberalization may have reduced consumption poverty in South Asia, but is skeptical 
about the purportedly neutral distributional effects of liberalization. Many suggest 
that the distribution of the positive effects of liberalization is somewhat skewed 
towards urban households rather than rural ones, and to wealthy rather than poor 
households (see Chen and Ravallion 2003; Cockburn 2002; Friedman 2000; Lofgren 
1999). The evidence in this regard comes mainly from Latin America because most of 
the economies there undertook rigorous reform policies in the mid-1980s following 
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the debt crisis in that decade. Legovini, Bouillon and Lustig (2001) find that 
inequality in Mexico rose sharply between 1984 and 1994, and rising returns to 
skilled labour accounted for 20 per cent of the increase in the inequality in household 
income. Similarly, Hanson and Harrison (1999) find that the reduction in tariffs and 
the elimination of import licenses accounts for 23 per cent of the increase in the 
relative wages of skilled labour during 1986-90, thus providing evidence for the role 
liberalization played in rising inequality in Mexico. Other country studies on Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, also show that skilled workers received increased 
premiums after liberalization when compared to their unskilled counterparts. (World 
Bank 2001) Therefore, the balance of the evidence points to increased globalization 
inducing greater income inequality.  
 
 In (developing) countries, trade liberalisation is likely to have had conflicting 
effects on the distribution of earnings. On the one hand, standard trade theory implies 
that trade liberalisation should result in a reduction in the skill premium. On the other 
hand, trade flows bring in new technologies and ideas that enhance the productivity of 
all workers, but especially that of skilled workers. Clearly, the notion of “skilled” and 
“unskilled” workers differs across countries. In less developed economies, those at the 
top of the earning distribution often have no more than a secondary degree. Yet, they 
have skills that will be enhanced by the arrival of new technologies, thus increasing 
their wage relative to that of uneducated workers.  
 
Irrespective of the exact nature of the cause of trade-induced inequality, it is 
sensible to presume that nations with higher stocks of human capital will experience 
less of the un-equalizing spiral consequent upon globalization and trade liberalization. 
Investment in education may yield a double dividend. It can not only promote growth, 
but also suppresses inequality by both bequeathing skills as well as moderating rises 
in skill-premia following an expansion of international trade. More generally, 
Tinbergen (1975) pointed out that changes in wage inequality are a result of the 
opposing forces that technological change (skilled labour demand) and education 
(skilled labour supply/ human capital) exert on relative wages. Eiche and Garcia-
Penalosa (2001) suggest that human capital accumulation plays a dual role in 
development.  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of increased trade on inequality, 
and investigate whether a higher human capital stock moderates this unequalising 
aspect of international trade; specifically the skilled-unskilled wage differential. High 
initial endowments of human capital, captured by data on average years of schooling 
for example, imply a more egalitarian society compared to countries with a lower 
human capital endowment. When societies that are more equal, open up their 
economies further, increased trade is likely to induce less inequality because the 
supply of skills better matches demand. Yet greater international exposure also brings 
about technological diffusion, see Winters (2004), further raising skilled labour 
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demand. This may raise wage inequality, in contrast to the initial egalitarian level 
effect of human capital. This paper will attempt to measure these two opposing 
forces. An innovation of this paper is to employ a broad set of openness indicators to 
measure trade-liberalization policies as well as trade policy variables. Another 
purpose of this analysis is to examine what type of education most reduces inequality. 
In settings of low human capital endowments, as measured by literacy or low primary 
school enrolment, a policy of relative neglect of primary in favour of expenditure on 
tertiary education may have a less than benign influence on inequality. The sample 
countries here exclude developed nations and economies in transition because of 
higher stocks of human capital in those regions (see table 1 at the end of the paper). 
The rest of the paper is as follows, section 2 presents the data and methodology, 
section 3 contains the empirical results, and finally section 4 concludes with some 
policy implications. 
2 Data and Methodology  
2.1 Data Description 
We are interested to look into the patterns of wage inequality in growth promoting 
Industrial sectors of developing countries. The UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality Theil 
measure which is calculated by University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) 
measures the dispersion of pay across industrial categories in the manufacturing 
sector. The data on wages is drawn from the Industrial database published annually 
by United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Our principal 
reason for using the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality Theil measure is that we are more 
interested in the functional distribution of income. Changes in the functional 
distribution between skilled and unskilled labour, will in turn affect the personal 
income distribution in countries that are unskilled labour abundant. Inequality will 
rise in developing countries as the skilled-unskilled labour wage premium increases 
and vice versa.  
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Variables Code Source Obs Std . Dev 
Dependent      
UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure: Developing 
countries only, 1999 
Theil99de
v 
University of Texas 
Inequality Project (UTIP) 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu 
109 (0.108) 
Endogenous Independent     
Openness Variables     
(Exports +Imports)/GDP, 1985 Lcopen Penn World Tables , 
Mark 6 
170 (0.589) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1985 Impnov85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (21.08) 
Import Penetration: manufacturing, 1985 Impnov85
m 
Pritchett (1996) 96 (12.79) 
Import Penetration: agriculture, 1985 Impnov85
a 
Pritchett (1996) 96 (3.818) 
Import Penetration: resources, 1985 Impnov85
r 
Pritchett (1996) 96 (6.594) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1982 Impnov82 Pritchett (1996) 95 (23.85) 
Import Penetration: manufacturing, 1982 Impnov82
m 
Pritchett (1996) 95 (13.107) 
Import Penetration: agriculture, 1982 Impnov82
a 
Pritchett (1996) 95 (3.67) 
Import Penetration: resources, 1982 Impnov82
r 
Pritchett (1996) 95 (9.66) 
TARS trade penetration: overall, 1985 Tars85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (36.91) 
TARS trade penetration: manufacturing , 1985 Tars85m Pritchett (1996) 96 (21.852) 
TARS trade penetration: agriculture, 1985 Tars85a Pritchett (1996) 96 (8.758) 
TARS trade penetration: resources, 1985 Tars85r Pritchett (1996) 96 (15.636) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1982 Tars82 Pritchett (1996) 93 (83.10) 
TARS trade penetration: manufacturing , 1982 Tars82m Pritchett (1996) 93 (26.47) 
TARS trade penetration: agriculture, 1982 Tars82a Pritchett (1996) 93 (9.786) 
TARS trade penetration: resources, 1982 Tars82r Pritchett (1996) 93 (54.652) 
     
Trade Policy Variables     
Tariffs     
Import duties as % imports,1985 Tariffs World Development 
Indicators 
99 (8.903) 
Tariffs on international inputs and capital goods, 1985 Owti Sachs and Warner (1995) 98 (0.165 
Trade taxes/ trade, 1982 Txtrdg Edwards (1997) 54 (0.031) 
Weighted average of total import charges: overall, 1985 Totimpv8
5 
Pritchett (1996) 76 (21.30) 
Weighted average of total import charges: manufacturing, 
1985 
Totimpv8
5m 
Pritchett (1996) 76 (22.75) 
Weighted average of total import charges: agriculture, 1985 Totimpv8
5a 
Pritchett (1996) 76 (21.57) 
Weighted average of total import charges: agriculture, 1985 Totimpv8
5r 
Pritchett (1996) 76 (18.15) 
     
 
Non Tariff Barriers 
    
Non trade barriers frequency on intermediate inputs, 1985 Owqi Sachs and Warner (1995) 96 (0.242) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: overall, 1985 Nontar85 Pritchett (1996) 76 (36.305) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: manufacturing, 1985 Nontar85
m 
Pritchett (1996) 76 (37.914) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: agriculture, 1985 Nontar85
a 
Pritchett (1996) 76 (35.268) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: resources, 1985 Nontar85
r 
Pritchett (1996) 76 (43.111) 
     
Composite Measures     
Sachs and Warner 1980s Open80s Edwards (1998) 61 (0.446) 
     
Measures based on residuals     
Leamers Measure, 1982 Leamer82 Edwards (1997) 47 (0.527) 
Gravity-residuals, basic model, 1982 Grmb Hiscos and Kastner 77 (9.922) 
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(2002) 
Gravity-residuals, augmented model, 1982 Grma Hiscos and Kastner 
(2002) 
77 (9.341) 
     
Price Based Measures     
Black market premium, 1985 Black Haririson (1996) 61 (0.604) 
     
 Skills     
Average years of schooling, 1999 Skills99 Baro and Lee (2001) 109 (2.914) 
Higher Skills     
Average years of higher schooling, 1999 Hyr99 Baro and Lee (2001) 102 (2.914) 
     
Independent :      
Initial Skills     
Average years of schooling, 1985 Skills85 Baro and Lee (2001) 105 (2.799) 
Average years of schooling, 1980 Skills80 Baro and Lee (2001) 105 (2.861) 
Average years of schooling, 1975 Skills75 Baro and Lee(2001) 106 (2.703) 
Average years of schooling, 1970 Skills70 Baro and Lee (2001) 101 (2.701) 
Average years of schooling, 1965 Skills65 Baro and Lee (2001) 99 (2.516) 
Average years of schooling, 1960 Skills60 Baro and Lee (2001) 99 (2.522) 
     
Instruments     
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed from a 
bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables, 1999 
Lfrkrom Frankel and Romer 
(1999)  
163 (16.75) 
Drop out rate, 1980s Drop80 Barro and Lee (1996) 125 (0.802) 
Number of school days Schday Barro and Lee (1996) 139 (23.43) 
Distance from the equator of capital city measured as abs 
(Latitude)/90 
Disteq Acemogolu (2001) 208 (16.65) 
 
 
The UTIP- UNIDO wage inequality measure is the between-group component of 
Theil’s T statistic, an entropy measure whose functional form is defined as:  
∑ ∑ +=+=
BW
i
i
i
i
i TT
N
N
Y
Y
Y
YT
Y
YT )log()(   (1) 
Where wT and BT  indicate within-group and between-group inequality measures 
respectively. N  and Y stand for total employment and total pay respectively, and 
subscript i  denotes group identity. As mentioned, UTIP captures 
BT  as their 
inequality measure, where groups are defined as categories within the UNIDO 
industrial classification codes.  
 
The UTIP data set provides Theil inequality measures for nearly 3,200 
country/year observations, covering more than 150 countries during the period 1963 
to 1999. Figure 1 illustrates trends in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
workers, over time in selected developing countries and is representative of different 
regions. All the country graphs, except one, show that wage inequality has been on 
the rise in the 1980s and 1990s. The only exception is Singapore, which belongs to a 
group associated with the ‘East Asian Miracle’ of the 1980s. However, this miracle 
remained confined to a few countries and as it is evident from the graphs, Singapore 
is not representative of the developing world. Since the 1980s and 1990s are 
associated with Structural Adjustment Policies under which many developing 
countries embraced trade liberalization, it is safe to suggest that the above trends in 
wage inequality also relate to these market reforms. The end of the paper lists all 
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developing countries, and the latest year for which the Theil wage inequality index is 
available.  
 
 
Figure 1 Wage Inequality Trends in Some Selected Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, we want to capture the effect of education (skilled) versus no education 
(unskilled) on relative wages. We would also analyze effect of higher skills within the 
framework to check if wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour are rising 
also because of returns to higher education are rising at higher proportion when 
compared with overall levels of education. In other words, is wage inequality also 
pushed by favouring higher skills in developing countries, or presence of skills 
(having education) a factor decisive enough to explain rise in wage gaps between 
skilled labour and unskilled labour? There is already some evidence that secondary 
education is more important in alleviating wage inequality than higher levels of 
education suggesting close correlation between higher levels of education and wage 
dispersion (Acemoglu, 2001). Investing in higher education alone is less effective in 
alleviating wage inequality. Since Theil captures wage inequality and not wage 
equality, we can easily test the positive effect of higher education in wage inequality. 
We are not saying that decreasing higher levels of education would then decrease 
wage inequality as is generally true with interpretations upon getting a positive sign 
(say between Theil Index and higher levels of education). If there is a positive 
correlation, then the only way to minimize the education bias of inequality is to raise 
Colombia
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
196
3
196
5
196
7
196
9
197
1
197
3
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
Years
W
ag
e 
In
eq
u
al
ity
Chile
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
Years
W
ag
e 
In
eq
u
al
ity
8 
 
the overall education levels of the population, which in turn would distribute skills 
homogenously within the population.  
 
A simple Heckscher-Ohlin or Stolper-Samuelson model would suggest that the 
overall return to skills would decline, and with it incentives for education, when a 
skill-scarce developing country opens up. (Wood and Ridao-Cano 1999) However in 
a multi-dimensional Stolper-Samuelson model approximating reality, endogenous 
growth with increasing returns to R & D, a skill-bias in tradables, skill shortages or 
unlimited supplies of unskilled labour could all lead to an increase in returns to skill 
following greater integration. (Arbache et al. 2004) Integration can also lead to the 
diffusion of more efficient education technologies, which would further augment the 
level of skills in the economy. (Winters 2004) The expected effect of openness and 
trade policy on wage inequality is positive in developing countries where a majority 
of the population is unskilled and uneducated. 
 
Initial education levels in a country capture the relative factor supply effect. Trade 
on the other hand captures the relative factor demand effect through skill bias 
technical change as also suggested by Acemoglu (1999; 2001). Other than the initial 
levels of education, trade becomes the second variable of interest. In view of this, the 
basic model for wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, based on 
integration is as follows 
],([ 0SkillsnIntegrationIntegratioflityWageInequa =  (2) 
Skills represent education levels. Average years of schooling are a measure of 
average skill levels in a country. The initial skills 0Skills  in this paper represent 
average years of schooling obtained before 1980s. There are outcome based measures 
(openness) and incidence based (trade policy) measures of integration (trade 
liberalization). The literature often ignores the latter effect, which only employs 
openness indicators. Take note however, that openness is an outcome of trade and 
industrial policies and not a policy indicator per se. Our formal empirical model 
would have 2 separate identifications then:  
]),([ 0SkillsOpennessnIntegratiofInequality =  (3) 
 (+)  (-) 
]),([ 0SkillsyTradePolicnIntegratiofInequality =
 (4) 
(+)  (-) 
Here wage inequality is a positive function of integration, which in turn relates 
positively to the degree of the openness of the economy in Eq. (3), or trade policies 
that promote greater openness in Eq. (4). Wage inequality negatively relates to the 
initial stock of skills in the economy as discussed. 
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 The econometric form of the wage inequality model based on openness and trade 
policy is as follows: 
iiii skillsOPENTHEIL 11111 65 ενκσ +++=   (5) 
iiii skillsTPTHEIL 22222 65 ενκσ +++=  (6) 
Where iTHEIL  is wage inequality in a country i for the 1990s (employing the latest 
value available for the Theil index for every country: see table 1, end of the paper for 
the exact year), iε  is the random error term, iOPEN captures openness and iTP is the 
indicator for the trade policy stance in the 1980s respectively. Also iskill65 measures 
initial skill levels proxied by average years of schooling for the population aged 25 in 
1965. Note that the skill acquisition parameter refers to a period well before the trade 
liberalization episodes post-1980.  
 
This analysis has a specific focus on trade and education. It employs 34 measures 
of openness and trade policy to carry out multiple regression analysis for Eqs (5) and 
(6), respectively. Average years of schooling for 1960, 1970, 1975 and 1985 are also 
employed for further robustness checks of the model with repeated specifications. 
 
Below, the author presents the taxonomy for outcome based and incidence based 
measures of trade following the grouping offered by Rose (2004:): 
 
1. openness (e.g. the ratio of trade or imports to GDP), an outcome based measure, 
2. trade flows, adjusted for country-characteristics (outcome based), 
3. tariffs (policy incidence-based) 
4. non-tariff barriers (NTBs) (incidence based), 
5. informal or qualitative measures, 
6. composite indices, and, 
7. Measures based on price outcomes. 
 
The core openness variable remains the overall trade share (the ratio of nominal 
imports plus exports to GDP), which has been extensively used in the literature. 
(Frankel and Romer 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2004; Alcala and 
Ciccone 2002; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Rodrik et al. 2004) Two other measures of 
openness are trade penetration (TARS) derived from the World Bank’s TARS system 
and overall import penetration (Impenov) respectively. Pritchett (1996) uses 16 cross-
sectional measures of trade penetration for developing countries. These are provided 
for two different years (1982 and 1985) and four different categories (overall, 
manufacturing, agriculture and resources sectors). Trade penetration measures are 
available for imports alone. See table 2 for yearly and sectoral decomposition of these 
variables. 
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There are many indicators of trade restrictiveness (incidence based) acting as 
measures of trade policy (Edwards 1998; Greenaway et al. 2001; Rose 2004): 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) recommend using simple averages of taxes on imports 
and exports. A simple import duty as a percentage of imports (Tariffs) is taken from 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Sachs and Warner (1995) constructed a 
composite measure of openness by using tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital 
goods (Owti). Edwards (1998) collected data on total revenues from taxes on 
international trade as a proportion of total trade (Txtrdg). Pritchett (1996) provides 
weighted average of total import charges (Totimpov), as well as sectoral categories of 
import charges (manufacturing, agriculture and resources). They can all be considered 
good proxies of trade restrictiveness and have been employed in the analysis.  
 
In the category of non tariff barriers, the coverage in terms of total imports is a 
widely used measure of trade policy (Rose 2004). Sachs and Warner (1995) 
recommend the use of frequency of non trade barriers on intermediate inputs (Owqi). 
Pritchett (1996) provides data on non-tariff barrier coverage for developing countries 
based on sectoral categories from UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development). The four different categories are manufacturing, agriculture and 
resources respectively.  
 
Sachs and Warner (1995) develop a composite measure of openness (Open80) but 
the measure has a drawback: ‘It provides only a binary classification –a country is open 
or closed. As are results, countries with different degrees of trade intervention are equally 
classified as open.’ (Edwards 1998; 385) Open80 is also used in this analysis. Leamer 
(1988) used the differences between predicted and actual trade intensity ratios as 
indicators of trade barriers (Leamer82). A less structural approach is taken by Hiscox 
and Kastner (2002). They use fixed country-year residual effects from two gravity 
models of trade (Grmb and Grma) (a simple version which links imports to GDP and 
distance, and an augmented one which adds measures of wealth, land and capital) to 
derive measures of trade policy orientation (Rose 2004) 
 
Finally, Sachs and Warner (1995) and Harrison (1996) have utilized a number of 
price-based measures of trade policy. The black market foreign exchange premium 
(Black) is one of them and we have employed it in our study. 
 
Overall, we have been able to obtain 34 measures of integration. These 34 
measures of integration would separately enter either equations (5) or (6) along with 
initial skills to determine wage inequality in at least 34 different regression equations. 
There could be potential endogeneity problems associated with the dependent 
variable, wage inequality and the explanatory variable, openness/trade policy. First, 
openness when measured by the trade share of national income is not truly 
exogenous, but an outcome of other factors. Second, the degree of wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers, or the country’s relative factor endowments 
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(Tavares 1998) may determine a country’s trade policy choices. Even though gradual 
and under the aegis of structural adjustment policies, decisions regarding openness 
were taken, it may be that more egalitarian labour abundant nations may choose to 
open up faster than less equal land (or mineral) abundant nations.  
 
An instrument is required to solve for the openness and trade policy variables’ 
potential endogeneity with wage inequality. The paper uses the predicted trade share 
from a gravity equation following Frankel and Romer (1999) to instrument for 
openness/trade policy. Following Rodrik et al. (2004), distance from the equator is 
the second instrument for openness/trade policy variables because the level of 
integration of an economy also depends upon its location in the world map. The 
Instrumental Variable (IV) regression model is a two stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimate beginning with 
iiii DisteqFROPEN 31111 εψτς +++=  (7) 
iiii DisteqFRTP 42221 εψτς +++=  (8) 
Here iFR  stands for predicted trade shares from gravity equations computed by 
Frankel and Romer (1999), whereas iDisteq  (distance from the equator) is a proxy for 
geography.  
 
Figure 2  
Responsiveness of Wage Inequality w.r.t Openness and Trade Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            (Actual)            (Predicted) 
 
 
In the first stage, Eqs (7) and (8) generate predicted values of openness and trade 
policy variables by regressing them on the two instruments. The second and final 
stage of the regression analysis involves employing the predicted openness and trade 
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policy variables in Eqs (5) and (6) respectively. Before carrying out the IV analysis, it 
is informative to look at simple bi-variate relations between integration (predicted 
trade shares and predicted tariff rates) with the Theil index. First column graphs are 
between openness, trade policy and Theil index for developing countries (Theil99dev) 
only. Trade indices show no clear relationship with wage inequality. However, once 
predicted, clear relations develop between trade and wage inequality as the second 
column in figure 2 shows. Increases in trade shares after liberalization leads to higher 
wage inequality, and the second graph also suggests that decreases in import tariffs 
exerts a negative and unequal distributional effect on wages. Steep slopes show high 
responsiveness of wage inequality with changes in these measures of trade. One of 
the reasons for the decrease in relative wages of unskilled labour, as tariffs fall, can 
be that the heavily protected sectors in many developing countries tend to be 
industries that employ a high proportion of unskilled workers. (Goldberg and Pavcnik 
2004) 
3 Results 
Before presenting second stage results, it is important to test the instruments. Figure 2 
shows good results for the relevance of instruments. Nevertheless, usual first order 
and second order relevance and validity tests are required to have confidence on IV 
relationships. We have utilized a rich set of openness and trade policy proxies though. 
Generally for most of the definitions, FR bilateral trade share has not been used 
before as an instrument. Table 3 presents first stage and higher order tests for the 
quality of instruments. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns present first stage results for all 
IV regression equations. FR trade shares significantly and positively determine all 
trade proxies. Though distance from the equator has been insignificant, we do know 
that location does matter in trade nevertheless. F-Statistics mostly pass Cragg and 
Donald rule of thumb test. In most cases for trade policy variables, the F-statistics is 
close to 10. Higher order asymptotic test results are presented in columns 5, 6 and 7. 
Heteroskedasticity robust estimates are used in the second stage. 2SLS bias is close to 
0 in most cases confirming the observation made in figure 2 regarding the suitability 
and power of IV over a simple OLS. The regressors are exogenous to the error term 
in all cases as all regression equations reject presence of endogeniety as can be seen 
from insignificant Sargan Statistics in column 5. Column 9 provides R-square for 
each corresponding second stage regression equation. High R squares obtained in the 
second stage with no presence of endogeneity give further credence to the second 
stage results.  
 
Table 4 provides results for OLS and IV. Column 2 covers all openness and trade 
policy variables for 34 regression equations. Column 5 gives results for initial skills 
representing average years for schooling for 1965. Such early levels of schooling are 
rightly assumed to be uncorrelated with post 1980 trade reforms and would 
exogenously determine wage inequality. The results show that initial skill 
endowments 65skills  relates negatively to inequality suggesting that developing 
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countries that are more educated to begin with do well on wage inequality. This is 
expected, and in-line with the theory that the countries where skill endowment is 
more evenly distributed, they are less prone to an adverse distributional effect in 
relative wages (Fisher 2001; Tuelings and van Rens 2002; Eiche and Cecilia 2001; 
Bourguignon and Morrisson 1990; Tilak 1989) Not only average years of schooling, 
but secondary years of schooling for all initial years 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1975 have 
been found to be negatively related with wage inequality. In contrast higher years of 
schooling for such initial years are weakly related with wage inequality as found by 
Mamoon and Murshed (2008)  
 
OLS results depict the same trend of insignificance seen in figure 2 for both 
openness and trade policy variables. How ever, by using FR trade shares (Lfrkrom) 
and distance from the equator (Disteq) as instruments improve the results 
significantly. The improvement has been observed for all regression equations. All 
openness and trade policy variables carry expected signs, and nearly all of them bear 
significant relationship to wage inequality. It would therefore, appear that trade 
liberalization does worsen the distribution of wages between skilled and unskilled 
labour in developing countries.   If total trade as a percentage of GDP doubles this 
would lead to a 40 percent increase in wage inequality which is quite significant. 
However the other variables that capture the importing side of trade have much 
smaller impact on wage inequality 
 
 
 
Above, we have checked the effects of relative factor supply for initial periods 
when it has been exogenous to trade reforms. Now we come to post reform effect 
known as skill bias technical change. Trade puts an upward pressure on skill 
demands. The dynamic trade models suggest that this is also true for developing 
countries. Many developing countries now invest in education and many have 
transformed a part of their populations into skilled labour to exploit increased 
opportunities of good jobs (skilled labour demand) which integration has brought to 
their door steps. Countries like China and India are good examples. In absolute terms 
they have more educated people than countries in North East Asia, where education 
levels are equally distributed among population. However we also know that 
populations in China and India have been less educated to start with. Education (years 
of schooling) has been heterogeneous, as only a segment of population (urban) have 
been provided with increased educational opportunities. Whereas, the uneducated 
also take part in improved opportunities which international trade provides through 
industrial sector growth. Most of them form the unskilled of all such sectors. In other 
words, supply of unskilled labour is far more elastic than supply of skilled labour in 
both countries. Nowadays, many developing countries have been trying to jump into 
the Chinese and Indian bandwagon by investing in education. Since developing 
countries face resource constraint; they can only focus on higher levels of education 
to exploit the dividends of growth through processes like trade. We would show in 
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coming lines that this phenomenon has inequalities partly because the focus has not 
been on ‘education for all’.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3 2nd Order Relevance and Exogeneity Tests for Instruments 
Variables  
Instruments 
(1st Stage results) 
Exogeniety 
(2nd Stage 
Higher 
Order) 
 
Relevance 
(2nd Stage Higher Order) 
 
 
Endogenous Independent 
 
Lfrkrom 
 
Distq 
 
F 
 
Sargan 
statistic  
 
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b) 
1st Stage 
heterosk
edasticit
y-robust 
 
N 
 
R2 
Openness Variables         
(Exports +Imports)/GDP, 1985 0.689*** -0.013 40.68*** 0.896 0.000 robust 63 0.67 
Import Penetration: overall, 1985 21.073*** -0.186 14.05*** 0.941 0.000 robust 51 0.47 
Import Penetration: manufacturing, 1985 13.391*** -0.125 14.82*** 0.925 0.000 robust 51 0.48 
Import Penetration: agriculture, 1985 3.544*** -0.010 14.37*** 0.900 0.000 robust 51 0.47 
Import Penetration: resources, 1985 3.652*** -0.053 4.05** 0.825 0.003 robust 51 0.20 
Import Penetration: overall, 1982 26.717*** -0.343 13.83*** 0.718 0.000 robust 51 0.47 
Import Penetration: manufacturing, 1982 13.823*** -0.213 14.88*** 0.671 0.000 robust 51 0.48 
Import Penetration: agriculture, 1982 3.792*** -0.013 13.60*** 0.844 0.000 robust 51 0.47 
Import Penetration: resources, 1982 8.888*** -0.096 6.53*** 0.759 0.000 robust 51 0.29 
TARS trade penetration: overall, 1985 33.041*** -0.599 11.48*** 0.702 0.000 robust 51 0.42 
TARS trade penetration: manufacturing , 1985 18.502*** -0.202 10.27*** 0.894 0.000 robust 51 0.39 
TARS trade penetration: agriculture, 1985 3.810*** -0.267*** 10.18*** 0.163 0.000 robust 51 0.39 
TARS trade penetration: resources, 1985 9.991*** -0.101 4.44*** 0.891 0.001 robust 51 0.22 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1982 39.081*** -0.773 10.14*** 0.580 0.000 robust 50 0.41 
TARS trade penetration: manufacturing , 1982 19.468*** -0.312 10.78*** 0.683 0.000 robust 50 0.41 
TARS trade penetration: agriculture, 1982 4.900*** -0.297*** 11.54*** 0.193 0.000 robust 50 0.43 
TARS trade penetration: resources, 1982 13.874*** -0.131 4.14** 0.800 0.001 robust 50 0.21 
 
        
Trade Policy Variables         
Tariffs         
Import duties as % imports,1985 -2.565* 0.146 2.27* 0.129 0.083 robust 48 0.13 
Tariffs on international inputs and capital goods, 1985 -0.124*** 0.002 4.86*** 0.756 0.001 robust 51 0.24 
Trade taxes/ trade, 1982 -0.013 0.0002 0.70 0.914 0.297 robust 27 0.08 
Weighted average of total import charges: overall, 1985 -18.861*** 0.344 8.04*** 0.711 0.000 robust 49 0.35 
Weighted average of total import charges: 
manufacturing, 1985 
-20.300*** 0.401 8.38*** 0.677 0.000 robust 49 0.36 
Weighted average of total import charges: agriculture, 
1985 
-12.121* 0.164 3.73** 0.867 0.125 robust 49 0.20 
Weighted average of total import charges: agriculture, 
1985 
-26.180*** 1.075** 6.19*** 0.338 0.000 robust 49 0.29 
 
        
Non Tariff Barriers         
Non trade barriers frequency on intermediate inputs, 
1985 
-0.042 0.003 0.68 0.239 0.425 robust 51 0.04 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: overall, 1985 -17.042*** 0.423 4.79*** 0.6133 0.006 robust 49 0.24 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: manufacturing, 1985 -16.367** 0.392 4.29*** 0.643 0.015 robust 49 0.22 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: agriculture, 1985 -12.121* 0.164 3.73** 0.867 0.125 robust 49 0.20 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: resources, 1985 -26.18*** 1.075 6.19*** 0.338 0.000 robust 49 0.29 
 
        
Composite Measures         
Sachs and Warner 1980s 0.146 0.003 0.90 0.455 0.266 robust 31 0.09 
 
        
Measures based on residuals         
Leamers Measure, 1982 0.162*** -0.0002 5.03*** 0.544 0.001 robust 22 0.46 
Gravity-residuals, basic model, 1982 -11.686*** 0.179** 28.01*** 0.436 0.000 robust 36 0.72 
Gravity-residuals, augmented model, 1982 -10.863*** 0.141 26.20*** 0.419 0.000 robust 36 0.11 
 
        
Price Based Measures         
Black market premium, 1985 0.260 0.012 1.13 0.312 0.187 robust 39 0.08 
         
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 4  
OLS and IV Regression Results for Theil99Developing 
Dependent Variable: Theil99dev 
Endogenous Independent Independent 
Eq. Openness 
Variables 
OLS IV Initial 
Skills 
OLS IV 
1 Lcopen 0.031** (0.014) 0.391** (0.017) Skills65 -0.014**(0.0064) -0.015** (0.006) 
2 Impnov85 0.005 (0.004) 0.0016** (0.0007) Skills65 -0.072 (0.0084) -0.015** (0.008) 
3 Impnov85m 0.001 (0.0007) 0.0025**(0.001) Skills65 -0.013* (0.008) -0.016** (0.008) 
4 Impnov85a 0.0027 (0.003) 0.0095** (0.004) Skills65 -0.011 (0.007) -0.012 (0.008) 
5 Impnov85r 0.0002 (0.0017) 0.009* (0.0049) Skills65 -0.011 (0.008) -0.017* (0.010) 
6 Impnov82 0.0005 (0.0004) 0.0012** (0.0005) Skills65 -0.012 (0.0078) -0.014* (0.0079) 
7 Impnov82m 0.0004 (0.0007) 0.0024** (0.0011) Skills65 -0.011 (0.0079) -0.015* (0.0084) 
8 Impnov82a 0.0004 (0.0027) 0.0091**(0.0043) Skills65 -0.011 (0.0079) -0.013 (0.0084) 
9 Impnov82r 0.0021** (0.0008) 0.0038** (0.0016) Skills65 -0.012 (0.0074) -0.013* (0.0075) 
10 Tars85 0.0005* (0.0002) 0.001** (0.0004) Skills65 -0.013* (0.008) -0.016** (0.008) 
11 Tars85m 0.0002 (0.0004) 0.002** (0.001) Skills65 -0.012 (0.0082) -0.019** (0.009) 
12 Tars85a 0.0001 (0.0017) 0.005 (0.0028) Skills65 -0.011 (0.008) -0.013 (0.008) 
13 Tars85r 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003** (0.0013) Skills65 -0.011 (0.007) -0.011* (0.007) 
14 Tars82 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.001** (0.0004) Skills65 -0.012 (0.008) -0.015* (0.008) 
15 Tars82m 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.002** (0.001) Skills65 -0.011 (0.008) -0.017* (0.009) 
16 Tars82a 0.001 (0.0014) 0.004 (0.003) Skills65 -0.009 (0.008) -0.014 (0.009) 
17 Tars82r 0.002*** (0.002) 0.002** (0.001) Skills65 -0.012 (0.007) -0.012* (0.007) 
       
 Trade Policy Variables     
 Tariffs      
18 Tariffs -0.001 (0.0013) -0.007 (0.005) Skills65 -0.018 ** (0.009) -0.025** (0.012) 
19 Owti -0.054 (0.059) -0.255* (0.132) Skills65 -0.011 (0.008) -0.013 (0.009) 
20 Txtrdg 0.110 (0.493) 3.825 (2.971) Skills65 -0.009 (0.015) -0.005 (0.026) 
21 Totimpv85 -0.001 (0.0004) -0.002** (0.001) Skills65 -0.009 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008) 
22 Totimpv85m -0.001 (00004) -0.002** (0.001) Skills65 -0.010(0.008) -0.012 (0.009) 
23 Totimpv85a -0.001* (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) Skills65 -0.010 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008) 
24 Totimpv85r -0.0003 (0.001) -0.003* (0.001) Skills65 -0.010 (0.008) -0.005 (0.010) 
       
 Non Tariff Barriers     
25 Owqi -0.038 (0.039) -0.297 (0.289) Skills65 -0.011 (0.001) -0.016 (0.012) 
26 Nontar85 -0.0003 (0.0004) -0.002* (0.001) Skills65 -0.011 (0.009) -0.021* (0.012) 
27 Nontar85m -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.002* (0.001) Skills65 -0.010 (0.008) -0.023* (0.013) 
28 Nontar85a -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.003 (0.002) Skills65 -0.012 (0.008) -0.033* (0.019) 
29 Nontar85r -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.001* (0.001) Skills65 -0.010 (0.008) -0.010 (0.008) 
       
 Composite Measures     
30 Open80s -0.043 (0.035) 0.127 (0.161) Skills65 -0.002 (0.008) -0.010 (0.015) 
       
 Measures based on residuals     
31 Leamer82 -0.064 (0.063) -0.058 (0.222) Skills65 -0.005 (0.010) -0.010 (0.011) 
32 Grmb -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) Skills65 -0.010* (0.005) -0.011** (0.005) 
33 Grma -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) Skills65 -0.010* (0.005) -0.010** (0.005) 
       
 Price Based Measures     
34 Black 0.023* (0.014) 0.024 (0.048) Skills65 -0.011 (0.007) -0.011 (0.007) 
       
 
 
                      ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively .Standard errors are presented in 
parenthesis.  
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Figure 3  
Skill Bias Technical Changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased investments in higher education captures the demand side of skill bias 
technical change caused by international trade where demand of skills have been 
rising faster then the supply? Figure 3 shows that trade liberalization augments skills 
in developing countries. This is true because international trade between developed 
and developing countries is followed by technology transfer (processes like learning 
by doing) which improves the general skill level. This means that part of the human 
capital stock is endogenous to the processes of trade, as hinted at by many 
endogenous growth models.  
 
A skill bias technical change would also capture the social inequalities in the 
populations as we have been arguing that education in most developing countries is 
heterogeneously distributed among populations. Most are still uneducated. Here a 
change in skilled human capital, which is endogenous to integration, will have its 
own independent effect on relative wages. Because trade utilize skilled and unskilled 
labour but offer higher returns to the skilled relative to unskilled, the effect of 
education which can be explained through trade should be positive on wage 
inequality. In other words, this positive effect will be different to that which is 
attributable to the initial level of human capital endowment.  
 
 
17 
 
ARGBENBGD
BHR
BOLBRA BRBBWA
CAF
CHL
CHN
CMR
COG
COL CRI CYP
DOM
DZA
ECUEGY
FJI
GHA
GMB
GTM
HKG
HND
HTI IDN
IND
IRN
JAM
JORKEN
KOR
KWT
LKA
LSO
MEX
MMR
MOZ
MUS
MWI
MYSNICNPL
PAK PAN
PER
PHL
PNG
PRY
RWASDN
SEN
SGPSLV
SWZ
SYR
TGO
TH
TTO
TUN
TUR
TWN
UGA
URYVEN ZAFZWE
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
W
a
ge
 
in
e
qu
a
lit
y(T
he
il i
n
de
x)
2 4 6 8 10
skilled labor (skills99)
AGO
ARG
BDI
BEN
BFA
BGD
BHR
BHS BLZBOLBRA BRB
TN
BWA
CAF
CHL
CHN
CIV
CMR
COG
COL
CPVCRICUB
CYP
DOM
DZ
ECUEGY
ETH
FJI
GABGHA
GMB
GNQGTM
HKG
HND
HTIIDN
IND
IRN
JAM
JORKEN
KOR
KWT
LKA
LSO
MAR
MDGMEX
MMR
MNG
MOZ MRT
MUS
MWI
MYS NAM
NGA
NICNPL
OMN
PAK PAN
PER
PHL
PNG
PRI
PRY
QAT
RWA
SAU
S N
SEN
SGPSLV
SUR
SWZ
SYC
SYR
TGO
THA
TTO
TUN
TUR
TWN
TZA
UGA
URY
VCT
VEN
YEM
ZAF ZWE
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
W
a
ge
 
in
e
qu
a
lit
y(T
he
il i
n
de
x)
4.6 4.8 5 5.2 5.4 5.6
skilled labor (predicted skills99)
Figure 4 
Skills versus Skill Bias Technical Change 
  
Figure 4 shows two graphs. The first one illustrates a simple relationship between 
skill levels in 1999 and wage inequality, and suggests that countries with higher 
stocks of skilled labour will have less inequality. The second graph has a different 
measure of skills (based on predicted values by regressing skill99 on FR trade shares; 
or those skills which can be measured in relation with trade), conversely suggests that 
skill accumulation due to greater global integration raises wage inequality. It implies 
that the skills that accrue directly through the processes of trade, contribute to wage 
inequality. This is in line with Tinbergen’s (1975) arguments, and the earlier 
discussion regarding the dual role of skilled human capital in the economy. 
 
In order to examine the dual (positive and negative) impact of skilled labour stocks on 
the skilled-unskilled labor wage differential, it is necessary to modify the basic ‘wage 
inequality model’ by introducing an interaction term between skills and some selected 
openness and trade policy measures.  
 
Conceptually speaking, the present wage inequality framework should contain: 
)](),([( 0skillsSkillsopennessSkillsfInequality ii=  (9)  
 (+)  (-) 
)](),([( 0skillsSkillsytradepolicSkillsfInequality ii=  (10) 
(+)  (-) 
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Skills which depend on Initial skill endowments have a negative effect on wage 
inequality in Eqs (9) and (10). The skills that accrue through trade liberalization 
exacerbate inequality. 
 
The econometric form of the modified wage inequality model is:  
iiii SkillsSkillsOPENnInteractioTHEIL 51113 99)99( ερλ ++×Ω+=  (11) 
iiii SkillsSkillsTPnInteractioTHEIL 73335 99)99( ερλ ++×Ω+=  (12) 
99Skills  represents skill endowments in 1999; a point in time when earlier trade 
liberalization had had time to play a role in skill accumulation in developing countries 
through technology transfer. Hence 99skills would depend on initial skill levels and 
trade. To isolate the effect of trade from initial skill endowment effect in 99skills , we 
need to first find instruments which can separately explain 99skills   in terms of trade 
and initial skill levels. Mamoon (2008) finds that drop out rates (Drop) and schooling 
days in a year (Schday) exogenously determine average years of schooling for 1999 
(Skills99). Here, we can instrument Skills99 with Drop80 and Schday. Such exercise 
will enable us to explain Skill99 only with reference to initial endowments. To 
capture the effect of trade on Skill99, we first interact Skills99 with some selected 
proxies of openness and trade policy to form Interaction (OPENxSkills99) and 
Interaction (TPxSkills99). Following the observation made in figure 4 and to ensure 
that only trade can explain this interaction term, we instrument it on FR (1999) 
bilateral trade shares (Lfrkrom) and distance from the equator. The interaction terms 
capture the effect of skills on inequality, while taking into account the extent to which 
each developing country has integrated with world markets. In the first stage 
Interaction (OPENxSkills99), Interaction (TPxSkills99) and Skills99 would be 
regressed over all four instruments identified above.  
=× iSkillOPENnInteractio 2)99(  
iiiii DisteqSchdayDropFR 911111 80 εγκθ +++++∂ l  (13) 
=× iSkillTPnInteractio 2)99(   
iiiii DisteqSchdayDropFR 1022222 80 εγκθ +++++∂ l  (14) 
iiiiii DisteqSchdayDropFRSkill 11333332 8099 εγκθ +++++∂= l  (15) 
Here iFR  stands for predicted trade shares from gravity equations computed by 
Frankel and Romer (1999), Drop80 stands for dropout rates in 1980, Schday 
represents schooldays in a year whereas iDisteq  (distance from the equator) is a proxy 
for geography. 
There is evidence that suggests unequal investments in higher education are 
important determinants of increasing inequalities in developing countries (Barro 
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1999). We want to know whether it is overall low education levels which are driving 
wage inequality in developing countries or it is that within education sector, it is 
higher level of education which is more closely related with skill bias technical 
change. According to Acemoglu (1999), trade induced skill bias technical change 
causes higher wage inequalities in developing countries through a wage premium 
effect induced towards higher levels of education. (Acemoglu, 2001)  
Here we are not only to test for effect of international trade on average levels of 
skills (skill99) but also on higher levels of skills (Hyr99). This provides us with 
additional interaction terms based on later category of skill levels. The latter category 
offers more-specific information about the relationship between inequality and higher 
levels of education. Equations (13), (14) and (15) would remain the same in the right 
hand side for higher skills (Hyr99). Only change in the left hand side would be that 
Hyr99 would be used instead of Skills99. The same change is due in equations (11) 
and (12).  
 
 Table 5 1st Stage Regression results for Instrumental variables 
First Stage Results: Interactions Between Openness/ Trade Policy and average Skills 
 Lcopen × 
Skill99 
Impen85 
× Skill99 
Impen82 
× Skill99 
Tars85 × 
Skill99 
Tars82 × 
Skill99 
Tariffs × 
Skill99 
Owti × 
Skill99 
Totimpv
85 × 
Skill99 
Owqi × 
Skill99 
Nontar85
× Skill99 
   
Skill90 
            
Lfrkrom 3.718 110.70 139.72 164.63 196.251 -16.769 -0.547 -75.181 -0.243 -70.47 0.0144 
 (2.43)** (3.82)**
* 
(3.67)**
* 
(3.18)**
* 
(2.96)**
* 
(-1.86)* (-3.2)*** (-3.6)*** (-0.94) (-2.7)*** (0.04) 
Drop80 -0.203 -2.918 -3.356 -5.865 -6.242 -0.115 -0.004 -0.0063 -0.0037 -0.796 -0.039 
 (-3.7)*** (-2.7)*** (-2.54)** (-3.8)*** (-2.7)*** (-0.32) (-0.65) (-0.01) (-0.39) (-0.69) (-3.2)*** 
Schday -0.029 1.26 1.208 0.947 1.152 0.5491 -0.001 -0.247 0.0005 0.464 -0.006 
 (-0.45) (1.00) (0.72) (0.42) (0.39) (1.10) (-0.18) (-0.27) (0.05) (0.36) (-0.45) 
Disteq 0.063 0.063 -1.161 -1.875 -3.391 1.164 0.009 1.603 0.017 1.853 0.034 
 (0.61) (0.03) (-0.46) (-0.54) (-0.77) (2.02)** (0.84) (1.20) (1.04) (0.98) (1.50) 
            
N 64 55 54 55 53 47 54 52 54 52 64 
F-statistics 6.42*** 7.35*** 7.18*** 6.36*** 5.72*** 2.30* 3.14** 4.34*** 0.68 2.60*** 4.15*** 
R-square 0.30 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.05 0.18 0.219 
 
First Stage Results: Interactions Between Openness/ Trade Policy and Higher Skills 
 Lcopen × 
Hyr99 
Impen85 
× Hyr99 
Impen82 
× Hyr99 
Tars85 × 
Hyr99 
Tars82 × 
Hyr99 
Tariffs × 
Hyr99 
Owti × 
Hyr99 
Totimpv
85 
×Hyr99 
Owqi 
×Hyr99 
Nontar85
× Hyr99 
 
Hyr99 
            
Lfrkrom 0.1859 6.635 7.940 9.539 10.976 -16.04 -0.026 -3.87 -0.007 -3.210 0.00001 
 (1.22) (4.00)**
* 
(3.82)**
* 
(13.2)**
* 
(3.12)**
* 
(-1.78)* (-2.32)** (-2.33)** (-0.38) (-1.52) (0.00) 
Drop80 -0.0061 -0.109 -0.115 -.229 -0.229 -0.085 -0.0003 0.032 -0.0001 0.036 -0.0009 
 (-1.12) (-1.79)* (-1.60) (-2.11)** (-1.88)* (-0.24) (-0.08) (0.50) (-0.16) (0.45) (-0.73) 
Schday -0.001 0.135 0.174 0.121 0.204 0.746 -0.0002 -0.01 -0.0001 0.006 -0.0005 
 (-0.11) (1.82)* (1.85)* (0.92) (1.28) (1.42) (-0.35) (-0.14) (-0.14) (0.06) (-0.32) 
Disteq 0.012 0.138 0.145 0.137 0.151 1.072 0.001 0.103 0.0005 0.152 0.004 
 (1.17) (1.24) (1.05) (0.67) (0.64) (1.85) (0.91) (0.94) (0.41) (1.10) (1.47) 
            
N 62 54 53 54 52 46 53 51 53 51 62 
F-statistics 1.31 7.09*** 7.00*** 5.06*** 5.12*** 2.28* 1.87 2.00 0.11 1.14 0.87 
R-square 0.08 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.30 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.009 0.09 0.05 
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
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Table.6 
Higher Order Relevance and Exogeniety Tests for Theil99dev 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
Eq
. 
Endogenous Dependent 
Variable: 
Wage Inequality in Developing 
Countries (Theil99dev) 
 
N 1st Stage 
heterosk
edasticit
y-robust 
 
Maxim
al 
2SLS 
Bias 
(b) 
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minE
val stat. 
Chi-sq() 
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significanc
e of 
endogen-
ous 
regressors  
F-Statistic 
Sargan statistic 
(overidentificati
on test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq() 
Endogenous Independent Variables:Interactions Between Openness/ Trade Policy and Average Skills for 1999 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Drop80, Schday) 
35 Interaction (Lcopen × Skill99) 62 Robust 0.0005 17.76** 1.91 2.400 
      (0.301) 
36 Interaction (Impen85 × Skill99) 55 Robust 0.0028 14.11** 2.29* 4.390 
      (0.111) 
37 Interaction (Impen82 × Skill99) 54 Robust 0.0037 13.46** 1.88 3.316 
      (0.191) 
38 Interaction (Tars85 × Skill99) 55 Robust 0.0027 14.16** 2.29* 3.795 
      (0.149) 
39 Interaction (Tars82 × Skill99) 54 Robust 0.1699 5.03** 2.28* 5.265 
      (0.072)* 
40 Interaction (Tariffs × Skill99) 47 Robust 0.2078 4.55** 2.61** 1.105 
      (0.574) 
41 Interaction (Owti × Skill99) 54 Robust 0.0037 13.51** 2.27* 1.678 
       (0.432) 
42 Interaction (Totimpv85 × 
Skill99) 
52 Robust 0.007 11.86** 2.37* 2.04 
      (0.360) 
43 Interaction (Owqi × Skill99) 54 Robust 0.5023 2.35** 2.27* 0.628 
       (0.730) 
44 Interaction (Nontar85× Skill99) 52 Robust 0.0145 10.55** 2.37* 0.717 
       (0.698) 
Endogenous Independent Variables:Interactions Between Openness/ Trade Policy and Higher Skills for 1999 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Drop80, Schday) 
45 Interaction (Lcopen × Hyr99) 62 Robust 0.286 3.78** 1.83 3.06 
      (0.215) 
46 Interaction (Impen85 ×Hyr99) 54 Robust 0.167 5.06** 2.28* 6.295 
      (0.043)** 
47 Interaction (Impen82 × Hyr99) 53 Robust 0.1279 5.69** 1.88 5.132 
      (0.076)* 
48 Interaction (Tars85 × Hyr99) 53 Robust 0.0033 13.75** 1.83* 3.096 
      (0.212) 
49 Interaction (Tars82 × Hyr99) 52 Robust 0.085 6.62** 1.84* 4.439 
      (0.110) 
50 Interaction (Tariffs × Hyr99) 46 Robust 0.933 0.43 2.72** 0.040 
       (0.980) 
51 Interaction (Owti × Hyr99) 53 Robust 0.082 8.25** 2.25* 3.779 
       (0.286) 
52 Interaction (Totimpv85 × 
Hyr99) 
51 Robust 0.395 2.98** 2.34* 2.350 
      (0.308) 
53 Interaction (Owqi × Hyr99) 53 Robust 0.955 0.33 2.25* 0.204 
       (0.903) 
54 Interaction (Nontar85× Hyr99) 51 Robust 0.348 3.29** 2.34* 1.059 
      (0.5669) 
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
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To investigate integration, six definitions of openness: Lcopen, Impnov85, 
Impnov82, Tars85 and Tars82 and five different proxies of trade policy namely 
Tariffs, Owti, Totimpov85, Owqi, and Nontarr87 are used (see summary statistics 
provided in table 2 for details about the variables). 
 
Table 5 provides results for the 1st stage. FR bilateral trade shares (Lfrkrom) and 
(Drop80) significantly explain the endogenous regressors. F-statistic is less than 10 in 
all cases; violating Cragg-Donald rule of thumb. However, we are dealing with 4 
instruments and thus a first order tests are insufficient and higher order asymptotic 
tests are required. Table 6 shows that higher order Crag Donald F-Statistics, which 
also corresponds to 2SLS bias, do relatively better in case of Skills99 than in case of 
Hyr99. Largely for Skills99, 2SLS bias has been 0 or close to it. Only for equation 43, 
higher order asymptotes show a large 2SLS bias in favour of OLS. For Hyr99, 2SLS 
bias is large enough to fail the test for at least 4 equations (50, 52, 53 and 54). Over 
identification problem is not present for most of the equations for the interaction 
terms of Skills99 or Hyr99. Good results for higher order asymptotic tests establish 
the statistical validity of the model while heteroskedasticity robust IV estimates are 
obtained for the second stage. The omitted variable bias has thus been addressed in all 
regression equations. 
 
Table 7 presents results for Interaction (OPEN×Skills99), Interaction 
(TP×Skills99) and Skills99. Interaction terms always enter wage inequality 
significantly at 5% and 10% levels of significance. Interaction(OPEN× Skills99) is 
positively related with wage inequality whereas Interaction (TP×Skills99) is 
negatively related with wage inequality confirming the presence of skill bias technical 
change for developing countries where skill demand has resulted in payment of skill 
premiums causing wages of skilled (educated) to rise at greater rates than the wages 
of unskilled (uneducated). 1st column shows that Skills99 are negatively related with 
wage inequality. Remember Skills99 have been instrumented by Drop80 and Schday, 
and thus represents post reform skills which only depend on the initial skills that have 
been prevailing in developing countries. Results confirm that countries that have 
integrated to world markets with skills (levels of education) that were homogenously 
distributed among the population have witnessed a fall in wage inequality. However 
for other measures of openness and trade policy, Skills99 have been insignificant. 
That may be due to the reason that other trade proxies represent the importing sector. 
For most developing countries, importing sector is more closely related with the 
manufacturing sector and the technical bias effect of trade would be more prominent 
in importing sectors. Importing sectors employ more skilled labour. For such cases 
interaction terms are over riding explanatory power of results with respect to Skills99. 
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Table 7  
Interactions between Openness/ Trade Policy and Average Skills 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Theil99dev 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Interaction Terms          
Lcopen × Skill99 0.0062          
(2.25)**          
Impen85 × Skill99  0.0002         
 (1.67)*         
Impen82 × Skill99   0.00013        
  (1.64)*        
Tars85 × Skill99    0.00012       
   (1.87)*       
Tars82 × Skill99     0.0001      
    (1.64)*      
Tariffs × Skill99      -0.002     
     (-1.82)*     
Owti × Skill99       -0.053    
      (-1.9)**    
Totimpv85 × Skill99        -0.001   
       (-2.1)**   
Owqi × Skill99         -0.087  
        (-1.30)  
Nontar85× Skill99          -0.002 
         (1.96)** 
Average Skills, 1999          
Skills99 -0.0279 -0.0034 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 0.031 0.013 0.011 0.021 0.018 
 (-1.80)* (-0.27) (-0.05) (-0.41) (-0.17) (1.09) (1.24) (0.95) (0.16) (1.25) 
N 64 55 54 55 53 47 54 52 54 52 
F 2.42* 1.46 1.45 1.80* 1.42 1.56 2.14* 2.48** 0.98 2.15* 
R2 0.63 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.18 0.42 0.48 0.32 0.28 
t- Values in the parentheses.***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
Standard errors are corrected for as run Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson 
and MacKinnon. 1993)× 
 
 
Does wage inequality in developing countries also follow the ‘Pareto principle’ 
where a rise in wages of ‘higher educated’ would be more than ‘only educated’? Are 
we capturing an element of within group inequality also when we say that wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled is rising? Because a rise in within group 
inequality can also capture a rise in wages of skilled labour which would be 
disproportional to not only less educated (low skilled) but also uneducated 
(unskilled). Is technical bias affecting the wages of highly skilled or “the proportional 
rise in returns to skills is across the board (for all education levels)”? By answering 
these questions, we can know ‘what level of education matters most’.  
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Table 8 
Interactions between Openness/ Trade Policy and Higher Skills 
Independent 
Variables  
Dependent Variable: Theil99dev 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Interaction Terms          
Lcopen × Hyr99 0.1001          
 (1.85)*          
Impen85 ×Hyr99  0.002         
 (1.34)         
Impen82 × Hyr99   0.002        
  (1.35)        
Tars85 × Hyr99    0.002       
    (1.67)*       
Tars82 × Hyr99     0.002      
     (1.49)      
Tariffs × Hyr99      -0.004     
      (-0.82)     
Owti × Hyr99       -1.013    
       (-1.9)*    
Totimpv85 × Hyr99        -0.007   
       (-2.2)**   
Owqi × Hyr99         -3.221  
         (-0.59)  
Nontar85× Hyr99          -0.01 
         (-1.89)* 
Higher Skills, 1999          
Hyr99 -0.408 -0.056 -0.093 -0.067 -0.106 1.066 0.219 0.123 0.4601 0.213 
 (-1.53) (-0.33) (-0.63) (-0.40) (-0.73) (0.58) (1.17) (0.60) (0.56) (0.81) 
N 62 54 53 54 52 46 53 51 53 51 
F 2.63* 0.85 0.98 1.31 1.14 0.37 2.06* 2.39* 0.19 2.75* 
R2 0.61 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.56 - 0.46 0.48 - 0.21 
                    t- Values in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
                   Standard errors are corrected for as run Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see     
                   Davidson and  MacKinnon. 1993) 
 
We already find evidence that by ignoring ‘education for all’, developing countries 
have increased the wage gap among the labour force based on skill differentials. Here 
we examine whether skill biased technical change benefits higher levels of education 
more. Interaction(OPEN×Hyr99) and Interaction(TP×Hyr99) will capture the trade 
effect of higher education on rising skill returns in developing countries. Table 8 finds 
supporting evidence that higher skills are related with wage inequality in developing 
countries. Higher coefficients for all cases when significance is achieved (columns 1, 
4, 7, 8 and 10) for ‘Hyr99 interaction terms’ in comparison to coefficients for 
‘Skills99 interaction terms in table 7’ suggest that wage inequality is more sensitive 
towards higher levels of education.  
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For example we know from table 4 that with each additional year of initial levels 
of schooling in a country, wage inequality is expected to fall by 10 percent. In table 7, 
with each additional year of schooling post liberalization, wage inequality is expected 
to rise by less than 1 percent. However with each additional year of higher levels of 
schooling (post secondary) post trade liberalization can double wage inequality. This 
shows that wage inequality is more sensitive to higher levels of education than all 
levels of education. This result may also confirm then that preference to higher 
education in developing countries is causing distortions in labour markets where 
following “Pareto Principle” the labour with higher levels of education earn more 
than just educated while uneducated are worse off. 
 
In this paper, our empirical frame work has actually captured the disproportional 
rise in returns to education (rising wage inequality) due to trade liberalization which 
favours education and higher levels of education even more. This is to say that we 
also find that returns to schooling rise with additional years of schooling and the 
relationship is a dynamic one to determine rising wage inequality in developing 
countries. Higher levels of schooling are more sensitive to wage inequality than over 
all levels of education.  
 
The non linear relationship between different levels of education and its economic 
outcomes     can also be extended to social returns to education and its potentially 
dual role. The different effects of different levels of education on economic 
development in this context are quite nicely stated by Krueger and Lindhal (2001): ‘ 
The social return (to education) can be higher because of externalities from education, 
which could occur, for example, if higher education leads to technological progress that 
is not captured by in the private return to that education, or if more education produces 
positive externalities, such as a reduction in crime and welfare participation or more 
informed political decisions. The former is more like if human capital (education) is 
expanded at higher levels of education while the latter is more likely if human capital 
(education) is expanded at lower levels’ (1107)  
 
Developing countries can invest in higher levels of education to exploit social 
externalities which can generate and sustain technical progress amid globalization. 
However, social returns to education by raising overall education level may carry 
more deep rooted positive effects in the economy. Our results strongly support in 
favor of raising over all education levels in the society The education bias of trade 
liberalization can be exploited in favour of the poor in a country through investments 
in all levels of education. That is one way to make trade induced growth good for the 
poor.  
 
The unequal returns to education in a dynamic trade fame work may partly explain 
why initial levels of education (captured by endogenously determined average years 
of schooling) are more closely related with good economic outcomes than higher 
education attainment (endogenously determined improved level of schooling) in 
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developing countries as also pointed out by other studies (see i.e., Krueger and 
Lindahl, 2001). This is not to say that basic education in itself as a target is enough. 
When the economy begins to trade more with the outside world, perhaps there is a 
need for a balanced education policy in the South. Providing the necessary 
higher/technical education should not, however compromise the achievement of 
primary education. Investing in higher education may not be as effective as investing 
in overall education levels of the population. Primary education is the first step 
towards a more skilled labour force, and it is a pro-poor policy, as the overwhelming 
majority of the poor remain uneducated. (Mamoon 2005)  
 
In the immediate time frame, in order to minimize the positive effects of trade on 
wage inequality in developing countries, one solution is to trade among each other, 
where more trade may take place in low skill intensive goods but developing 
countries can also trade in relatively skill intensive produce. Developing countries lie 
in a heterogeneous plain where some may be following relatively skilled intensive (in 
local terms) production activities. Regional trade can absorb the negative effect of 
skill bias technical change. However in the longer run, investment in education sector 
would remain the key factor to effect wage dispersion in developing countries. More 
resources in education sector need to be channeled to secondary and primary 
education levels in addition to higher education as suggested by Acemoglu (2001). 
4 Conclusions 
In summary, the discussion here suggests that the earning inequalities in developing 
countries have two important determinants. First, there are significant entrenched 
inequalities in educational attainment. Second, increased international trade 
transforms these education inequalities into wage inequalities by favouring skilled 
labour over unskilled labour. In line with previous studies, this analysis found that 
education might be central to explaining the increasing gap in relative wages between 
skilled and unskilled workers in developing countries. Although the analysis supports 
the argument that those countries with a higher initial level of human capital do well 
on the inequality front, it also suggests that human capital, particularly the part related 
to higher education, which accrues after trade liberalization has in-egalitarian effects. 
Governments in developing countries tend to invest more in higher education at the 
cost of primary education in order to seize short-term benefits from globalization.  
One reason for this bias towards higher education, in education policies in 
developing countries may lie in the belief that elementary education has a very 
limited direct role in determining growth rates. According to Barro (1999), the rate of 
economic growth responds more to secondary or higher education levels rather than 
elementary schooling. International trade in manufacturing and services is one of the 
key engines for growth. This often requires college graduates or those who have at 
least finished high school. One reason why India and China became havens for 
international outsourcing and trade is that they have managed to accumulate relatively 
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educated and skilled human capital by investing in higher education.1 In the last two 
years, the United States has lost two million manufacturing jobs to China, India and 
other third world countries, mainly in the Far East. Consequently, in 2001, the 
manufacturing sector in the US shrank to just 18 per cent of GNP from 48 per cent in 
1950 and it is expected to recede to just 10 or 11 per cent within the next 10 years2. 
Forrester Research, a market research firm predicts that at least 3.3 million white-
collar jobs and $136 billion in wages will shift from the US to low-cost countries by 
2015 and most of them will find their way to Indian or Chinese centers3. Countries in 
the South that are set to benefit most from globalization are those that transformed at 
least a segment of their labour force into a relatively skill intensive force by investing 
in higher education programs. Therefore, it is no surprise that in order to be 
competitive, many developing countries have a tendency to invest in higher education 
at the cost of primary education to achieve greater growth. For example, Pakistan’s 
current education policy skews towards higher education. In fiscal year 2003, the 
government increased its higher education budget to Rs 5 billion from Rs 800 million 
five years ago—an increase of nearly 400 per cent. In 2004, the government doubled 
the previous year’s expenditure on higher education. In contrast, the budget for 
primary education increased by a meager average of 4 per cent per annum for the last 
few years. This apparent pro-growth higher education policy of Pakistan at the 
expense of primary education may very well accelerate growth, but it excludes the 
poor and unskilled and will likely lead to increased wage and income disparities in 
the country.  
As noted earlier, governments in developing countries tend to focus their 
education policies on higher education in anticipation that this investment will yield 
quick dividends in the current international business environment. Although they are 
right, they need to realize that promoting higher education at the cost of primary 
education breeds greater income inequality in the absence of countervailing policies 
and is not pro-poor. Consequently, governments need to increase the mean level of 
human capital through a balanced education policy where primary education is valued 
as much as higher education. An equitable education policy will decrease the skilled-
unskilled wage premium, as the overall supply of low skilled and uneducated workers 
decreases and the supply of educated workers increases, as well as give rise to general 
equilibrium effects that reduce wage inequality. Additionally such policies are 
consistent with the millennium development goals (MDGs). This researcher agrees 
with the recent World Development Report (2006), which suggests that wider access 
to education and jobs could ‘level the economic playing field’ and improve 
livelihoods. 
                                               
1 In other export areas such as textiles, which use unskilled labour intensively, these countries 
vast populations dictate that the skilled-unskilled premia will not narrow even if the absolute real 
wages of the unskilled increased.  
2 http://www.freenewport.com/us/useconomy.asp 
3 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040223/login/main1.htm 
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These results also have implications for the speed at which trade policies are 
liberalized. Developing countries require time to adjust to an open regime because of 
their low-skill level stocks; the implication being that better educated nations should 
liberalize faster. If skill levels were homogenously distributed, free trade would lead 
to a more-equal and pro-poor growth. In the short-run, it may be wiser for developing 
economies to first look for regional trade agreements by following the model of the 
European Union; something that is not easy to achieve amongst poor countries who 
contemporaneously do not trade much with each other. But there may be potential in 
that direction. The rationale for regional trade is that developing countries lie in a 
heterogenic plain where each country is located at different rungs of the technical 
ladder. To climb the ladder, the more efficient way may lie in increased South-South 
trade rather than North-South trade in a regional framework as in the case of ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian Network). Similar trade agreements would enable 
developing countries to liberalize their economies slowly, while at the same time 
enabling their workforce to ascend the skill ladder (Mamoon, 2004) 
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Table 1 List of  Countries for Theil Index (Theil99devloping) 
Afghanistan  (1988)                                
Algeria  (1997) 
Angola (1993)                      
Argentina (1996)                                 
Bahamas, The (1990)                       
Bahrain  (1992)                     
Bangladesh (1990)                 
Barbados (1997)                        
Belize (1992)                                
Benin (1981)                         
Bhutan (1989)                       
Bolivia (1997)                                     
Botswana  (1997)                   
Brazil (1994)                                       
Burkina Faso (1981)                       
Burundi (1990)                       
Cameroon (1997)               
Cape Verde (1993)                 
Central African Republic 
(1993)                                
Chile (1997)                         
China  (1985)                        
Colombia  (1997) 
Congo, Rep. (1988)                 
Costa Rica  (1997)                
Cote d'Ivoire (1997)                                            
Cuba (1988)                            
Cyprus (1997) 
Dominican Republic 
(1985) 
 
Ecuador (1997) 
Egypt,  (1997)                     
El Salvador (1997)              
Equatorial Guinea    
(1990)              Eritrea 
(1988)                       
Ethiopia  (1997)                              
Fiji (1997)                                  
Gabon (1994)                       
Gambia, The  (1981)                                     
Ghana   (1995)                   
Guatemala  (1997) 
Haiti  (1988)                            
Honduras (1994)                     
Hong Kong, China 
(1997)              India  
(1997) 
Indonesia  (1997)                       
Iran, Islamic Rep (1993)                   
Iraq (1985) 
Jamaica (1990)                        
Jordan (1997)                
Kenya  (1997)             
Korea, Rep.  (1997)                      
Kuwait (1997)                                  
Lesotho (1994)                         
Liberia  (1985)                        
Libya (1980)                                  
Macao, China  (1997)                   
Madagascar (1988)                
Malawi (1997) 
Malaysia  (1997)               
Mauritania (1978)                    
Mauritius (1997) 
Mexico (1997)                      
Moldova (1994)                      
Mongolia (1994)                       
Morocco (1997)                    
Mozambique 
(1994)                
Myanmar (1997)                       
Namibia (1994) 
Nepal  (1996)                     
Nicaragua (1985)                        
Nigeria (1994) 
Oman (1997) 
Pakistan  (1996)                    
Panama  (1997)                    
Papua New 
Guinea (1989)                     
Paraguay (1991) 
Peru (1994)                   
Philippines  
(1997)                             
Puerto Rico 
(1997)                     
Qatar (1994) 
Rwanda (1985)                                         
Saudi Arabia 
(1989) 
Senegal (1997)                    
Seychelles (1988)                   
Singapore (1997)                          
Somalia (1986) 
South Africa (1997) 
Sri Lanka (1994)                   
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines (1994)                         
Sudan (1972)                      
Suriname (1993) 
Swaziland ((1994) 
Syria (1997) 
Togo (1981) 
Thailand (1994) 
Tonga (1994) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago (1994) 
Tunisia (1997) 
Turkey (1997) 
Taiwan (1997) 
Tanzania (1990) 
Uganda(1988) 
United Arab 
Emirates (1985) 
Uruguay(1997) 
Venezuela (1994) 
Western Samoa 
(1972) 
Yemen (1986) 
Zambia (1994) 
Zimbabwe (1997) 
 
 
 
